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U.S. Animal Agriculture Policy:
Problems and Solutions
Steven Mischel
ABSTRACT. The current structure of the American animal agriculture industry is fraught
with problems. The externalities from it are disproportionately felt by a limited group of
individuals who lack political and economic influence. Far from taxing or constraining
animal agriculture, The U.S. Government subsidizes its worst practices through a variety
of direct and indirect methods. This paper recommends four specific reforms in
agriculture policy that will level the playing field for small farmers and push the industry
toward greater economic efficiency.

I. Introduction
When consumers imagine the origin of their meat, milk, eggs and other
animal products, they tend to think of green pastures and jovial farmers.
As late as the 1950s, this may have been reasonably accurate. In reality,
the US animal agriculture industry has been on a path of industrialization
since the 1930’s (Pew 2008, 5). Farms have come to bear a greater
resemblance to warehouses or factories than to the idyllic green fields of
the consumer imagination.
The agricultural industrial revolution has not been costless. Intensive
animal agriculture creates air and water pollution, antibiotic resistance,
declining home values, as well as concerns about environmental justice
and animal rights. Due to poor policy, many costs associated with these
problems are shifted to the public in the form of either externalities or
taxes to pay for subsidies. As jurist doctorate candidate Kyle LandisMarinello explained:
Companies like Tyson Foods and Cargill never pay for their
contributions to the climate change, water, and topsoil crises. Nor
do they pay for the pain they cause their animals by raising them
in some of the most inhumane conditions imaginable. Economists
call this situation a market failure (Landis-Marinello 2008, 150).
Industrial agriculture, however, is not without its benefits. In the last fifty
years, US milk production has doubled, meat production has tripled, and
egg production has quadrupled (Delgado 2003, 3907). In 2005, the
23
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average American consumer spent just over 2% of his annual income, and
still took home 221 lbs of meat. Thus, consumers were able to purchase
13% more meat in 2005 than they would in 1970, for about half the price
(Pew 2008, 3). Thanks to industrialization, Americans could spend less
and take home more than ever before.
Government has played a significant role in the shift toward greater
industrialization. Subsidy and regulatory policy supported the highly
industrialized segment of the industry more than smaller farmers. A
thorough review of the literature reveals that poorly thought-out
agricultural policies have broad and often unforeseen consequences,
which affect the economic and physical wellbeing of every American.
Therefore, this paper asks in its final section: what specific reforms of US
policy should be implemented with respect to animal agriculture?
A. THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE
As late as the 1950s the American agricultural industry was dominated by
a large number of small farmers. A family unit usually owned each farm,
and it was common for the farm to be passed from generation to
generation. Most animal producers farmed crops in addition to their
livestock, which provided greater diversification and allowed them to add
value to their crops by feeding a portion to their animals (Starmer and
Wise 2007, 2). This system began a radical transformation in the 1960s.
As farm policy changed, it encouraged greater production and lower
prices (Starmer and Wise 2007, 6-7).
As prices for grains fell, an inconspicuous yet revolutionary event
occurred. In the mid 1960s, Wendell Murphy, a small North Carolina
grain mill owner, opened the first hog feeding operation (Stith and
Warrick 1995). As a grain mill operator, Murphy had an excess of useless
cornhusks and other biomass that he would otherwise pay to dispose of.
Instead of discarding this byproduct, he fed it to a small herd of hogs kept
near the mill. This process turned waste into a valuable commodity and
quickly turned Murphy from part-time schoolteacher to agricultural
entrepreneur.
What made this process revolutionary was not the feed; after all,
farmers had been feeding grains to their animals for centuries. The
revolution was that Murphy was not a “farmer” in the traditional sense.
Previously, animal farmers raised both crops and animals; Murphy raised
only pigs and kept them in a facility geographically distant from the
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source of food. He effectively took the farm out of animal farming. A new
designation arose to describe these facilities: “Animal Feeding
Operations” (AFOs). The EPA defines AFOs as facilities that hold
animals in high density for at least 45 days a year and do not produce
their own grain (Gurian-Sherman 2008, 83).
As grain prices continued to fall, the business model developed by
Murphy evolved from feeding hogs scraps to buying large quantities of
grain as feed. Today, 95% of a confinement-fed pig’s diet is corn and soy
(Starmer and Wise 2007, 10) and 37% of all grains produced in the U.S.
are used for feed (USDA 2010, 3). Almost none of the diet consists of the
grasses traditionally consumed by hogs. This model has gradually spread
as fewer farmers participated in mixed grain/animal production. The
model was also extended to include cows, chickens, and turkeys.
As more operations of all types adopted the big confinement facility
model, they bought or pushed out smaller farms through a series of anticompetative practices and embraced ever-increasing economies of scale.
Between 1982 and 2006, the number of hog farms fell by 500,000 to
about 60,000 (Gurian-Sherman 2008, 15), with similar results for other
animals. Despite a fall in the number of farms, the number of animals
raised has remained relatively constant. This consistency was possible
only through increasing farm size and concentration.
Larger and more concentrated farms raised new environmental
concerns, which are discussed further in the next section. The EPA
responded by creating a new class of farm, the “Concentrated Animal
Feeding Operation” or CAFO. A CAFO is defined as a facility that
houses more than 1,000 animal units (700 milking cows, 1,000 beef cows,
2,500 hogs, or 82,000 laying hens) and does not produce its own feed
(Gurian-Sherman 2008, 83). The number of animal units produced in
CAFOs increased by 91% from 1982 to 1997 (USDA 2000, A-4), making
it the dominant form of animal farming in the United States.
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(Center for Agriculture 2004)
The graph above describes the increasing size and concentration of
animal farms in the dairy industry. The Center for Agriculture found “the
average herd size for the U.S. grew from just 19 cows in 1970 to 128
cows in 2007, [an annual] growth rate of 5.1 percent” (Center for
Agriculture 2004). More important than the steady rise in the national
herd size is the dramatic jumps in California and New Mexico. This is
indicative of a broader trend toward geographic concentration. Another
example is the striking increase of hog CAFOs in eastern states like North
Carolina, where two counties experienced an increase of one million hogs
each in the 1990-98 time period. These trends threaten to push affected
regions past their environmental carrying capacity as the air and water is
contaminated by millions of gallons of animal waste (Hubbell and Welsh
98, 294).
B. SUMMARY OF ISSUES IN ANIMAL AGRICULTURE
This section describes the externalities created by the animal agriculture
industry. It is important to realize all of the issues addressed are more
pronounced in highly industrialized farms. Their size and geographic
proximity to one another concentrate and magnify negative externalities,
which are diminished by smaller or more traditional facilities.
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Additionally, properly managed CAFO alternatives benefit from
sustainable manure management and are more dispersed, which allows for
greater environmental sustainability.
1. Air Quality
Anyone who has lived near a CAFO can tell you they do not smell
pleasant. The odor can carry for miles, often attracting flies and other
pests (Burmeister 2002, 72). The objection to CAFOs, however, goes
beyond sensitive noses. Exposure to air from CAFOs, both by those
working inside the facility and those living in its vicinity, has been linked
to symptoms such as respiratory illness, diarrhea, headaches, burning of
the eyes, and deterioration of the brain and nervous system (ICASH
2002). This has led prominent health advocates such as the American
Public Health Association to cite more then 40 scientific studies in their
call for a moratorium on CAFOs (Ikerd 2008).
2. Water Quality
Animal waste contaminates the water table in three distinct ways. The
first source of contamination is the application of manure to cropland for
fertilization. The chemicals and bacteria found in the manure to run off
with rain or irrigation. The result is the pollution of both ground water
and aquifers. (Pew 2008, 23-27) The second source of contamination is
major spills. Manure is often stored in large open-air pits called
“lagoons”. These lagoons often swell with rain and can burst,
contaminating local waterways (Gurian-Sherman 2008, 51-52). The final
source of contamination is leakage from waste storage facilities.
Researchers estimate leakage from an average large facility to be more
then four million gallons a year (Williams 2006, 377). Ground water
around CAFOs is frequently contaminated, even if there is no obvious
leakage.
Water pollution poses major health risks to those who eat fish or
drink from polluted sources. Pollution from animal waste is also a major
cause of “dead zones,” areas of extreme biological scarcity both inland
and near the US Coastline (Cook 1998, under Consequences of Water
Pollution). The loss of aquatic life in major fisheries poses a major threat
to the US fishing industry, and water contamination leads to the closing
of major beaches. The dual impact on fishing and tourism has brought
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economic ruin to many costal communities (Walsh 2008). It is important
to note that CAFOs are not the only cause of these dead zones. Fertilizers,
pesticides and other agricultural runoff are also likely causes. But given
that animals consume more then a third of U.S. grain harvest, they
account for a large part of this pollution at least indirectly (USDA 2010,
3).
3. Antibiotic Resistance
Any human patient prescribed antibiotics receives a relatively large
therapeutic dose so that none of the microbes survive. If a patient were to
take antibiotics in levels too low to kill off all the bacteria (referred to as
sub-therapeutic) or took the drugs infrequently, it would likely lead to the
evolution of drug resistant bacteria, which would endanger the wellbeing
of the patient and pose a threat to public health. On the other hand, the
feed industry adds sub-therapeutic levels of antibiotics to animal feed to
induce them to add weight and mature faster. This practice saves the meet
industry about $1.5 billion to $3 billion annually (NRC 1999, 185-186).
Medical professionals studying the issue are fearful that antibiotic feed
additives will lead to the evolution of new strains of antibiotic resistant
diseases (Gilchrist et al. 2007, 314). This is no trivial matter. Antibiotic
resistant infections kill 90,000 people a year and cost the US between $4
billion and $5 billion. Additional resistance would make the situation
exponentially worse (Pew 2008, 15).
The European Union recognized the threat of emerging antibiotic
resistance and responded by banning the use of veterinary antibiotics to
promote growth. After antibiotics were taken from the feed “the
prevalence of resistant bacteria declined in farm animals, retail meat and
poultry, and within the human general population” (ScienceDaily 2005).
It appears that this problem can still be solved if we act quickly.
4. Land Prices
Due to the significant hazards and inconveniences associated with living
near a CAFO, it is not surprising that surrounding property is not in high
demand. Herriges et al. (2005) found that property could experience a 9%
decline in value when a moderate to large CAFO is constructed upwind.
This is a significant cost to the local comminutes, and one not borne by
all equally.
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5. Environmental Justice
The EPA defines environmental justice as “fair treatment and meaningful
involvement of all people, regardless of race, ethnicity, culture, income,
or educational level with respect to the development, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies” (EPA
2002). CAFOs, with all of their environmental risks, violate this principal
by locating “in poor and African American rural communities, causing
disproportionate adverse health and socioeconomic impacts” (ICASH).
The citizens of these communities therefore receive less protection from
environmental laws, and the previously mentioned hazards are born by
those least financially able to cope with externalities forced on them.
6. Animal Rights/Welfare
Living conditions for the animals in CAFOs are deplorable by any
measure. Livestock are cramped, abused, and often left to die without
proper veterinary care (Matheny and Leahy 2007, 325). Because there is
no economic or legal penalty for abusing animals, the practice is likely to
continue. Although there is no way to put a price on the suffering, the
misery felt by animals in CAFOs is not something that should be inflicted
if reducing suffering is a goal. Further, there are more humane
alternatives like free-range, and hoop barns, which can produce meat at
similar cost (Gurian-Sherman 2008, 23-24).
7. Production and Price
Some have defended the rise of industrial agriculture or the subsidies it
receives by arguing that it has led to increased production and lower
prices. They additionally argue that the industrial model is necessary to
feed America’s and the world’s growing demand for food. All three of
these arguments are at best only half true.
While it is true that industrialization leads to greater production, it is
not true that modern alternatives are incapable of producing at the same
cost. Medium sized AFOs (animal feeding operations) can produce meat
of equal or greater quality at a similar price while avoiding many of the
environmental externalities of their larger competitors (Gurian-Sherman
2008, 2). A large number of studies, including those performed by the
USDA, find that once profits from subsidies are excluded, medium sized
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operations are about as cost effective as large CAFOs. A smaller number
of studies of free-rage farms find those facilities that implement new
rotational grazing systems can operate at even lower cost, with virtually
no environmental damage.
The second issue to consider is whether cheap animal products are in
fact desirable. It is undoubtedly desirable to have an agricultural industry
that is able to produce efficiently. It would, however, be highly inefficient
for that industry to artificially lower prices by shifting cost to the public
either through externalities or through taxes used to pay for subsidies. As
was shown above, the industry shifts major environmental cost to the
public and, as will be shown in the next section, is the beneficiary of
major subsidies as well. Higher prices are not in and of themselves a good
thing. If, however, those prices are accurate signals of the true cost of
production, then economic theory suggest they will lead to a more
efficient level of production.
The final issue to consider is if industrialized animal agriculture is the
only way to feed the growing population. As was already shown,
alterative methods can produce animal products in similar quantities.
There is, however, the more fundamental question of whether it is best to
feed the world’s growing population animal products at all. The grain-tomeat conversion ratio, that is the amount of grain required to produce a
single pound of meat, varies from species to species. Cows are by far the
most inefficient. It requires thirteen pounds of grain to produce a single
pound of beef. Hogs are somewhat better with a conversion rate of six to
one. Chickens are the most efficient with a conversion ratio of three to
one (Singe and Mason 2006, Ch. 16). Any animal requires more calories
of raw grain as feed than it produces in meat. There are similar
inefficacies in terms of water and fuel. If the goal is to feed a growing
population, the solution would be to feed grains directly to people and not
to process those foods through animals.

II. Government Interventions
A. ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS
When an industry generates negative externalities, theory dictates the
industry should be taxed such that the supply curve reflects the true social
cost. The result would be a shift in the supply curve from S1 to S2 , a
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decrease in equilibrium quantity from Q1 to Q2 , and a rise in price from
P1 to P2.
Tax on Meat Production

In his 2008 study, Fiala found that, far from taxing the animal
agriculture industry, the United States and other Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries provided a
variety of subsidies and support programs. This shifts the supply curve
right from S1 to S3 . The price falls from P1 to P3 , and equilibrium quantity
rises from Q1 to Q3. The effect is to move the market ever further away
from the socially optimal level.
Subsidy on Meat Production
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It is difficult to estimate the exact values for each of these points, due to
a variety of indirect government actions that obscure the total support
given to the industry. It is even more challenging to estimate the socially
appropriate level of production (Q2 ), as it is difficult to estimate the total
cost of the externalities. Thanks to reporting by the OECD, however, the
total production (Q3 ) in 2002 is known to have been 24,511,138 metric
tons of beef. It is also certain that total direct producer support for the
same group was close to 23 million US dollars. Using this data, and
available data on the supply and demand curves for meat production, Fila
estimates production was approximately 9 million metric tons greater than
it would have been without any subsidy, a 37% increase (Fila 2008, 17).
It is important to recognize the shortcomings of Fila’s estimates. First,
he does not account for indirect subsidies or regulatory programs that may
benefit the industry. I discuss these programs in more detail later in this
section. Second, he aggregates all OECD countries and gives no US
specific estimates for either subsidies or overproduction. Finally, Fiala
estimates over production only for the beef industry and does not look
into the other highly subsidized sectors of animal agriculture.
Before continuing to look at the specific government support
programs, it is important to consider in each case what effect the program
has on the size and composition of the industry. Certainly, each program
has the effect of increasing production (Moving from Q2 to Q3 ), but some
programs also favor one form of production over another. As we saw in
the summary of issues, large production facilities tend to be more prone
to externalities than smaller or free-range operations. In spite of this, each
of the federal programs examined tend to favor large CAFOs over their
smaller competitors.
B. DIRECT SUBSIDIES
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) was originally
included in the 1985 farm bill to help small farmers meet new EPA
regulations. For the first seventeen years, the program was relatively
small (e.g. only $200 million in 1996) and payments were capped at a
modest $50,000 per operation. CAFOs were specifically excluded from
participation. As a result, many small farmers received modest subsidies
to cover their environmental compliance expenses (Gurian-Sherman
2008, 37).
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The program underwent dramatic changes in the 2002 and 2008 farm
bills. In 2002, the restriction on CAFO participation was lifted, and the
maximum funding level per farm rose to $450,00. The total federal outlay
for the program also increased to $400 million, and has since increased
to a projected $1.75 billion in FY 2012 (USDA 2008). The 2008 farm bill
did little to change the situation. It reduced the maximum payment to
$300,000 but allowed the secretary of agriculture to make exceptions for
special projects such as methane digesters. On the other hand, it
specifically caps payments to organic farmers at $80,000, 27% of the
maximum amount non-organic producers can receive (USDA 2008).
Because pasture-based operations have little to no compliance cost,
the EQIP subsidy overwhelmingly goes to support CAFOs. Furthermore,
the USDA uses potential environmental damage, among other criteria,
when prioritizing among competing projects. This allocates money to the
most dangerous farms first, favoring CAFOs over smaller operations
(Gurian-Sherman 2008). It also directly encourages many of the
externalities discussed earlier by reducing the cost of activities associated
with them. For example, EQIP encourages water pollution by paying for
the transportation and spreading of manure over cropland. In total,
approximately $113 million dollars of compliance costs are shifted to the
taxpayer every year through this program (Gurian-Sherman 2008, 38).
USDA milk subsidies include both direct and indirect subsides that
have often conflicting effects on the price consumers pay. The Milk
Income Loss Contract (MILC) provides direct payments to farmers
whenever prices fall below a level set by the government (James 2006, 4).
The Dairy Product Price Support Program (DPSP), formerly the Milk
Price Support Program, provides an indirect subsidy to producers. The
program buys all the surplus milk offered for sale at a given price. This
effectively creates a price floor and ensures producers will earn a
guaranteed profit (Jesse, Cropp, and Gould 2008, 2). The MILC’s direct
payments encourage farmers to produce as much milk as possible as their
incomes are guaranteed even if prices fall drastically. This would
otherwise cause the retail price of dairy to fall except that the DPSP
creates a price floor that keep retail prices high. The result is massive
surplus of diary products, which the USDA attempts to sell abroad though
large export subsidies. In total, the direct subsidies cost $4 Billion
annually, and the additional costs to consumers due to price floors are
difficult to estimate but are likely in the millions (James 2006, 1).
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C. INDIRECT SUBSIDIES
The Department of Agriculture makes counter cyclical payments to
farmers of Title I crops when the market price falls below the cost of
production. As a result, even when prices are low, farmers are encouraged
to plant more corn, soy, and other commodities. Additionally, commodity
farmers receive an annual direct payment for every acre of grain farmed.
The result of both programs is massive over-production of grain and a
steep fall in price.
The most commonly used blend of feed in hog CAFOs consists of
95% corn and soy, with similar blends for other animals. Feed costs
represent 60% of a CAFO’s operating expense. As a result, a reduction
in corn and soy prices is a major benefit to animal farmers. Starmer and
Wise (2007) employ a model commonly used to evaluate the impacts of
“commodity dumping” to estimate the price reduction for corn and soy
due to subsidies. They find that, because of subsidies, feed costs were
26% below the cost of production between 1995 and 2007. That translates
into as much as a 15% savings for CAFOs, worth an estimated $945
million per year in the period between 1997 and 2005 (Starmer and Wise
2007, 10-11). This disproportionally benefits CAFOs because smaller
farms, particularly grass-fed farms, have little to no feed cost. The table
below details the significant savings experienced by different types of
CAFOs.
Indirect Subsidies to CAFOs Through Reduced Grain
Cost Between 1997 and 2005

Average
Annual
Subsidy

Average
Annual
Subsidy per
CATO

Average
Annual
Subsidy per
Large CAFO

Average
Reduction in
Cost of
Production

Broilers

$1.25 billion

$766,000

na

13%

Dairy

$733 million

$233,000

$588,000

6%

Eggs

$432 million

$388,000

na

13%

Feedlot Beef

$500 million

$72,000

$2.20 million

5%

Swine

$945 million

$325,000

$5.01 million

15%

Total

$3.86 billion

Sector

(Gurian-Sherman 2008, 34)
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Starmer and Wise find that, if the subsidies for corn and soy were
eliminated, it is likely that CAFOs would lose much of their current
advantage. They concede, however, their estimates were made in a period
of low food prices. And if the prices rose above the cost of production,
CAFOs would experience a major increase in operating cost, and the
indirect subsidy to CAFOs would become less significant. In 2008 and
2009, food prices, including corn and soy, were pushed up by a
combination of ethanol production, increased demand, and market
speculation. As they predicted, meat producers have taken a significant
hit in profitability, but the market does not appear to have yet fully
adjusted (Schmitz, Furtan, and Schmitz 2009). This is likely because the
capital-intensive business model used by CAFOs presents significant
barriers to entry and exit.
The second major indirect subsidy to CAFOs comes from the
National School Lunch Program (NSLP). The NSLP, which is
administered by the USDA, has been providing free or reduced-cost
lunches since 1946 and currently serves about 27 million students
(Yeoman 2003). Although at first it might not seem obvious that this is a
subsidy program, its primary function has been to absorb agricultural
excess.
The USDA buys hundreds of millions of pounds of excess beef,
pork, milk and other high-fat meat and dairy products to bolster
or normalize dropping prices. It then turns around and dumps
those raw commodities into the National School Lunch Program
(Dillard 2007, 223).
The USDA appears to have a poor eye for quality when purchasing
products for students. In 1998, they bought 20 million pounds of beef
from a ConAgra subsidiary, even though it had a history of E. coli
contamination. Twelve children became sick, and one was hospitalized
(Nibert 2002, 170). The program has been especially kind to the dairy
industry. Despite the prevalence of lactose intolerance, especially among
minorities, “schools are helpless in the face of current USDA regulations
that require that cow’s milk be the only beverage permitted in all federally
assisted school meal plans” (PCRM 04).
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D. MARKET CONCENTRATION
As CAFOs have become more prevalent, they have also changed the
structure of the meatpacking industry. Through vertical and horizontal
concentration, they have pushed out or bought out much of the
competition and now control meat virtually from birth to table. This level
of control has come at the expense of independent firms who find it
increasingly difficult to operate in this environment.
Anti-trust lawyers with the justice department use the HerfindahlHirschmann Index (HHI) to measure market concentration. A measure of
less than 1000 is considered unconcentrated, and over 1800 is considered
highly concentrated. In 1998, the HHI for the beef packing industry was
1936 (Cowan 2001, 12). To state this figure in a more understandable
way, the top four firms in the beef industry controlled 84% of the
slaughter capacity. Similar concentration exists in the market for pork
(66%), chicken (59%), and turkey (59%) slaughter (Hendrickson and
Hefernan 2007, 1-2). This concentration was the result of a long process
of horizontal integration by retail meat venders such as Tyson and Cargill.
As they expanded, they bought out most of the independent
slaughterhouses traditionally used by small farmers.
Expanding firms have also integrated their supply chain vertically
through a system of production contracts. Under such a contract, the meat
packer owns the cow, often even before it is born, and the farmer cares
for it until it is old enough to slaughter. The meat packer then takes
possession of the animal. After the animal is slaughtered, it is sold.
Because many of the packers also own their own brand of meat products
(eg. Tyson or Smithfield), the packer simply ships it to the grocery store.
Under this model, control and ownership of the product can be
maintained throughout the supply chain (Pittman 2005, 4-6).
Some have argued greater market control, especially the production
contract system, is good for small farmers as it eliminates the risk of
owning a large herd (Stokes 2006, 2-3). However, increased market
control has the effect of pushing out small, independent farmers. If one
company controls all of the slaughterhouses in an area, it can refuse to
slaughter a farmer’s animals unless he signs a production contract. This
has the effect of forcing farmers to enter the corporate farming
infrastructure, or leave farming altogether. The Packers and Stockyards
Act bans this practice. But the GAO and USDA Inspector General both
find that poor enforcement has left the law toothless (Hayes 2006, 2-3).
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III. Recommendation for Change
A. FRAMEWORK
Four criteria were used to decide which recommendations to make in this
paper. First, does the proposal help address one or more of the problems
or causes of industrialization? Second, does the proposal favor one
segment of the industry over another? Many of the changes in agricultural
policy undertaken of the last fifty years were implemented without
considering who would benefit. As a result, CAFOs were often the
beneficiary and have managed to overpower their smaller competition. In
this paper, proposals are evaluated with an eye toward restoring balance
to the animal agriculture industry. Third, is it economically efficient?
Many proposed reforms come with major costs in implementation or
administration. This paper attempts to weed through all the proposals and
find the ones that are most efficient. Finally, is it politically feasible? The
agricultural lobby, the animal agriculture lobby in particular, is very
powerful (Williams 2006, 371). As a result, reform of agricultural policy
takes much political effort. Therefore, each proposal is evaluated on its
political feasibility in addition to its practicality.
1. Reform the National School Lunch Program
The USDA should:
1. Shift funds away from meat and dairy and towards toward more fruits
and vegetables
2. Provide calcium rich non-dairy alternatives such as orange juice and
soymilk
3. Provide low-fat vegetarian alternatives
Reforming the National School Lunch Program meets all four of the
criteria. It lowers demand for meat by eliminating an indirect subsidy,
shifting the market toward the socially efficient equilbirim. Because
CAFOs are the primary source of NSLP supplies, it levels the playing
field for smaller producers. It comes at very little cost as the funds are
merely shifted to healthier foods. And because it has the support of
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dietitians, parents, and physicians, it is politically feasible (PCRM). It
does not directly solve one of the problems, but by reducing demand for
animal products, it will move the market toward a more socially efficient
level of production.
In addition to those who would like to see NSLP reform, government
efficiency advocates would like the program to be ended outright. The
program is prone to fraud, both on the part of contractors who use
excessive billing to charge expenses to the USDA as well as on the part
of parents whose children are ineligible for the program but still
participate (Edwards 2009). Schools have little incentive to investigate
either case as the bill is passed along to the federal government. Some
schools may even encourage parents to enroll their children fraudulently
in order to receive greater aid.
This paper recommends reform rather then repeal for two major
reasons. First, outright cancellation would eliminate an important social
program. Almost 60% of school children participate in the program and
without it many would go hungry (Levine 2008, 2). Although the program
contributes to obesity amongst school children, its absence would signal
an equally precarious possibility of malnutrition (Waterloo Courier 2010).
Second, total cancellation is politically infeasible. Despite several waves
of criticism over the decades and a radically changing political climate,
the NSLP has managed to maintain overwhelming public support; perhaps
because no politician is willing to put themselves in the position of taking
food from schoolchildren (Lavine 2008, 9).
Many budget hawks are opposed to reform as well. Most of the
reforms suggested by parents’ groups are often very expensive as they
include requirements for things like local, free range, and organic food.
One study estimates that the increased cost for such programs could be as
much as 25% (James 2009). Although this paper does not call for any of
reforms beyond a shift away from animal products, it should be
recognized that such reforms are not without cost.
2. Enforcement of the Packers and Stockyards Act
The USDA should increase its enforcement of the Packers and Stockyards
Act and other anti-trust legislation. This will allow small and mediumsized farmers access to slaughter facilities without being forced into
producer contracts. It has the advantage of not requiring any new laws as
the legal and enforcement framework already exist but is underutilized.
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Because new laws do not need to be passed, it is more politically feasible.
This reform is supported by economists (eg. Stokes 2006), anti-trust
advocates (eg. Hayes 2006, O’Brien, Hamilton and Luedeman 2005), and
producer advocates (Farmer Legal Action Group). But there are two main
sources of objection. The first comes from those who argue that increased
concentration and contracting reduces price volatility for producers and
consumers (eg. Stokes 2006). The true benefits of risk reduction,
however, are likely outweighed by the benefits of increased competition.
The second is from those who argue that increased enforcement would
come with a high cost. Certainly, there would be increased cost associated
with trying more cases and employing more investigators, but this cost
should be minimal given there is a pre-existing framework for
enforcement including lawyers trained in anti-trust law.
3. Animal Rights Legislation
Current law protects wild animals and pets from many forms of animal
abuse. States make exceptions, however, for animals used in agriculture.
Further, the primary federal legislation, the Humane Methods of
Livestock Slaughter Act, is poorly enforced. Due to a lack of legal
protection, animals experience inhumane conditions both on the farm and
in the slaughterhouse.
State and federal authorities should extend some legal protection to
farmed animals and increase enforcement of existing laws. Such a policy
could be modeled after nations with tough animal rights laws, such as
Switzerland and Sweden. Under such statutes, farms undergo inspection
by government veterinarians, and prosecutors aggressively pursue those
accused of animal abuse (Ball 2010). Smaller farmers using humane
practices would be little affected, while larger producers would be forced
to internalize the cost of better animal treatment (Matheny and Leahy
2007, 343). Furthermore, because legal action can happen at either the
state or federal level, it is more politically feasible and can benefit from
experimentation among the states. It would, however, score low in the
efficiency criteria. Nations implementing tough animal rights laws have
found there are few prosecutors and judges knowledgeable about the
complexities of animal rights law and the United States would likely be
no different (Ball 2010).
Increased legal protection has obvious support from animal rights
advocates (eg. Landis-Marinello 2008; Singer 1990) but has the surprising
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support of another group. Many domestic abuse advocates (e.g. Sauder
2000) recognized that abusive individuals often begin with cruelty toward
animals. They call for increased legislation and enforcement of animal
rights as a way to prevent domestic violence before it begins.
On the other hand, there is criticism of this proposal. Some legal and
philosophical scholars argue that animals do not deserve rights, and
extending them to animals confuses our understanding of rights
themselves (i.e. Cohen 2001). This paper assumes that animals have and
deserve rights and does not delve into the question any further as it is
covered at great length in other sources.
Still others argue that responsibility lies with the consumer, and we
should vote with our wallets rather than look to the government (e.g.
Webster 2002). These commentators advocate for labeling like free-range
and cage-free. There are, however, significant challenges that make the
implementation of a labeling system impractical. Current USDA
requirements for animal welfare labels are lax and inspections are rare. If
stricter labeling standards were implemented, producers would likely
ether engage in “window dressing” to give the appearance of welfare or
abandon labeling all together (Bracke, De Greef, and Hopster 2004, 37).
4. Reform EQIP
Congress should:
1. Reduce the maximum payment any individual entity can receive from
the EQIP program
2. Remove language from the law that favors large farms including:
! Funding for manure spreading and storage
! Funding for methane capture facilities
! Special limits on funding to organic facilities
Reform of the EQIP program would make it look much like it did
before the 2002 farm bill. A greater number of facilities and a higher
proportion of small farms would receive funding which would eliminate
a major imbalance in the market. It would be significantly more efficient
as the compliance costs associated with high-polluting operations are
shifted back to the operations themselves, and they are not paid for by
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taxpayers.
It has been speculated that elimination of this subsidy alone would
cause major shifts in the industry. As Ribaudo et al. found in their study
of the economic effects of water quality management: “The costs of
complying with manure management requirements could instigate
structural and geographical shifts in the livestock and poultry sectors”
(Ribaudo et al 2003, 2).
Reform of EQIP is supported by small farm advocates (e.g. GurianSherman 2008; Pew 2008) who believe it will make small farms more
competitive. On the other hand, efficiency and small government
advocates argue for total elimination of the program (e.g. Riedl writing
for the Heritage Foundation 2002). Although total elimination would be
the most economically efficient option, it would not be politically
feasible, which is why this paper argues for a more modest reform.
Even in its weaker form, it is worth noting that reforms like this
would come with significant administrative cost. The (stated) reason the
Natural Resource Conservation Service recommended the maximum
payment level be raised in 2002 was to reduce inspection and oversight
cost. Issuing more payments to a greater number of farmers will certainly
mean greater cost, but the benefits will likely outweigh the costs.
B. REFORMS NOT INCLUDED
There are two reforms which are noticeably absent from the
recommendations mentioned here. The first is a total ban on subtherapeutic antibiotics. This could be accomplished either though
legislative action or by decree of the FDA. Either action would likely
receive little public support, as the issue is largely unknown to the general
public, while at the same time drawing a heavy response from the
pharmaceutical industry. If the recent healthcare bill is any indication, the
pharmaceutical industry is one group you do not want to be opposed to.
The second missing reform is an end to subsidies for corn and soy. While
this would end indirect subsidies and be highly efficient, it would take on
the very powerful grain farmers lobby. Additionally, the rise in grain
prices in recent years has lead to a significant decline in subsidies as
countercyclical payments were phased out. As a result, a removal of those
subsidies would have little effect but still be very politically costly.
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IV. Conclusion
The current structure of the animal agriculture industry is highly
inefficient and creates significant externalities. Economic theory would
suggest that governments should tax producers to limit production to a
level that is economically efficient. However, Fiala (2008) finds that
developed countries including the US have chosen to do the opposite and
provide subsidies to this industry. Moreover, Gurian-Sherman finds that
the subsidies overwhelmingly aid the largest and most externality-prone
producers in the industry. Hayes (2006), O’Brien, Hamilton and
Luedeman (2005), the General Accounting Office, and the USDA
Inspector General all find that that poor enforcement of regulations
exacerbate the problem by allowing large producers to acquire significant
market power.
This paper has outlined four specific ways to eliminate or reduce the
externalities associated with modern animal agriculture by limiting
government support to the industry. First, reduce the amount of animal
products purchased through the National School Lunch Program. That
will limit the indirect subsidy to the industry (Edwards 2009) and lead to
better student nutrition (PCRM). Second, increase enforcement of the
Packers and Stockyard Act (O’Brien, Hamilton and Luedeman 2005),
which will allow more independent producers into the industry and
thereby reduce the externality associated with large producers. Third,
strengthen animal rights laws and enforcement. That will improve the
quality of life for livestock. Finally, limit EQIP payments to create a more
equitable distribution of funds and allow small operations to compete.
This paper has attempted to look at all the major issues in the
industry, but there are inevitably things left out. Chalk (2004) and
Seebeck (2004) both study the issue of food security and animal
agriculture. This is a complex issue dealing with international trade,
homeland security, and major veterinary diseases like mad cow. The
second issue that is noticeably absent is global warming. FAO (2004)
finds that emissions of green house gasses from animal agriculture are a
major cause of global warming. Although neither issue was addressed in
this paper, they merit further research.
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